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COMMENTS
SECURITIES ExcHANGE AcT oF

1934--CML

REMEDIES BASED

UPON ILLEGAL EXTENSION OF CREDIT IN VIOLATION OF REGULA·

T-F9llowing the stock market crash of 1929, there was considerable agitation for the regulation, and even the elimination, of
the purchasing of securities on credit. Indeed, the extension of credit
for the purchasing of securities became an issue in the 1932 presidential campaign and finally, in 1934, came under direct federal
control. Although the federal regulations were intended to eliminate the hazards associated with the extension of credit for the
purchasing of securities, all the available evidence indicates that
the substantial amount of credit in the stock market was a significant factor in pushing up prices during the bull market, and in
magnifying the drop in prices that took place in May and June
of 1962.1 The speculators seem to have had no difficulty in satisfying
their demands for credit from a variety of lenders who were adept
at circumventing both the federal and stock exchange regulations.
To understand the problems involved in purchasing securities on
credit, and in particular the civil remedies based upon the illegal
extension of credit, it is essential to understand the various pertinent credit regulations. Indeed, the failure on the part of some
courts to appreciate the complexities of these regulations has led
to confusing statements in several opinions.2
TION

I.

DESCRIPTION OF REGULATIONS

The customer who purchases securities on credit is called a
"margin trader," and the "margin" is the amount that he deposits,
the balance being advanced by a "broker-dealer" or other lender.
Sectipn 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 grants to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System4 the power to
control margins by regulating the maximum amount of credit
which can be extended for the purpose of purchasing securities.
l See Rossant, Credit as a Catalyst, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1962, p. 27, col. 2; JVhat
Made the Market Go JVild?, Bus. Week, June 9, 1962, p. 90.
2 See, e.g., Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959) (court seems to
treat an exchange violation as a federal violation); Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc.
2d 628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1961) (court seems to treat a federal
violation as an exchange violation).
3 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1958). This statute is hereinafter
referred to as the "act" or the "Exchange Act."
4 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is hereinafter referred to
as the "Board" or the "Federal Reserve Board."
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Pursuant to the act, the Board has issued its Regulation T,5 regulating broker-dealers, and its Regulation U, 6 regulating banks, both
of which control the extension of credit to margin traders. The
Federal Reserve regulations establish minimum requirements only
and do not prevent either stock exchanges or lenders from adopting additional and higher margin requirements. 7
There are two distinct types of margin requirements, one applying only at the time of purchase and the other applying at all
subsequent times. An initial margin is required to be deposited
in connection with the purchase of a security on credit. The initial
deposit reflects the margin trader's equity in the security on the
date of purchase, the equity being equivalent to the market value
of the security reduced by the amount of credit outstanding on
the security. On the other hand, if the market value of the security
subsequently declines, the margin trader may be required to deposit additional margin to maintain his equity in the security at
a specified "maintenance" level, which is generally lower than the
level required for his initial equity. For example, if, under the
initial margin requirement he must deposit fifty percent in connection with the purchase of a security valued at 100 dollars, his
initial equity would be fifty dollars. Should the value of the security decline to sixty dollars, his equity in the security will decline
to ten dollars, and, assuming that the "maintenance" requirement
is twenty-five percent of the current market value, he must deposit
an additional five dollars.

A. Federal Regulations
Since a discussion of Regulation U is beyond the scope of this
comment, the following description is limited to Regulation T,
which "applies to every member of a national securities exchange
and every broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities
through the medium of any such member.'' 8 Only securities listed
on a national exchange are subject to its provisions; 0 however,
certain listed securities, notably securities of the federal government and state and local bonds, are exempted. 10 Under Regula12 C.F.R. § 220 (1959).
Id. § 221.
Id. §§ 220.7(e), 221.3(i).
Id. § 220.I.
O Id. § 220.3(c)(2). "Listed securities," referred to in Regulation T as "registered securities," include securities having unlisted trading privileges on a national securities
exchange and securities exempted by the SEC. Id. § 220.2(d).
lu Id. § 220.3(c)(2). The term "e.xempted" securities is used with the same meaning
i;

6
7
8
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tion T unlisted securities have no collateral value and must be
purchased strictly on a cash basis.11 Finally, the extension of credit,
with securities as collateral, for purposes other than purchasing or
carrying securities is not subject to the Regulation. 12
Although the Exchange Act grants to the Board power to
prescribe both an initial and a maintenance requirement, 13 Regulation T sets only an initial margin requirement. The Board
establishes the initial margin requirement by promulgating, from
time to time, the "maximum loan value" for listed securities in
terms of a percentage of their current market value.14 For example,
if the "maximum loan value" is set at thirty percent, the margin
trader must deposit seventy dollars in connection with the purchase of a security valued at I 00 dollars. Since all securities purchased on credit are included in the margin trader's general margin
account,1 5 the amount of margin which must be deposited in connection with a purchase of additional securities is reduced to the
extent of the "available credit" in the account. 16 The "available
credit" is the total of the current maximum loan values of all
securities held in the particular account reduced by the credit outstanding in the account.17 In other words, although the maximum
loan value of a security is initially determined at the time it is
purchased, the maximum loan value of the securities held in the
account is continually recalculated on the basis of present margin
requirements and current market values18 to determine the account's "available credit."
Although the Board prescribes the "maximum loan value"
from time to time, credit initially extended on a purchase may be
retained regardless of a reduction of the margin trader's equity
due to declines in market price, termination of the listed or exempt
as that given to it in § 3(a)(l2) of the Exchange Act [48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(l2) (1958)]. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(e) (1959).
Id. § 220.3(c)(2).
Id. § 220.4(f)(8).
48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1958).
12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c)(2) (1959). The "maximum loan value" is prescribed in id.
§ 220.8 (Supp. 1962). The "current market value" of a security is its total cost or the
net proceeds of its sale. Id. § 220.3(c)(4).
15 Id. § 220.3(a). For "special accounts," see id. § 220.4.
16 Id. § 220.3(b)(l).
17 Ibid. The credit outstanding, referred to in Regulation T as "adjusted debit balance," includes the current market value of the securities sold "short" in the account
and other specified items that could make it differ from the net debit balance of the
account. Id. § 220.3(c)(4).
18 The "current market value" of securities held in the account is the closing sales
price of the security on the preceding business day. Id. § 220.3(c)(4).
11
12
13
14
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status of securities in the account, or changes in initial margin
requirements. 19 However, when more credit is outstanding on the
securities in the account than would be permitted in the event of
a new purchase of the same securities under current margin requirements, the account becomes "restricted," and Regulation T
places limitations upon the withdrawal and substitution of securities in a "restricted" general account.20 Listed or exempted securities can be withdra-wn from a "restricted" account only if other
listed or exempted securities (counted at their maximum loan
value), 21 or cash, are deposited in the account in an amount equal
to the specified retention requirement, which is a percentage of
the current market values of the securities withdrawn. 22 However,
the margin trader may sell one security and buy another of no
greater value on the same day since the status of an account is
determined only at the close of each day. 23 If there is "available
credit" in the account, obviously there is no restriction on withdrawals.
Certain transactions are excluded from the requirements of
the general margin account, for example, the exercise of subscription rights. To avoid hampering the acquisition of additional
capital by industry and to facilitate the maintenance by existing
shareholders of their proportionate ownership of a corporation,
the Board prescribes a lower margin requirement for securities
acquired through the exercise of subscription rights.24 However,
the special subscriptions account cannot be used as a means of
avoiding the margin requirements of a general account.25
Id. § 220.7(b).
Id. § 220.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1962). "Restriction" may result, for example, from a decline in the market value of the securities in the account or an increase in margin
requirements.
21 The maximum loan value of an exempted security is determined by the brokerdealer in good faith. Id. § 220.3(c)(2).
22 Id. § 220.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1962). The retention requirement is prescribed in id.
§ 220.B(c) (Supp. 1962).
23 Id. § 220.4(h)(l).
24 Ibid. The margin is set at 25% of the current market value of the securities
acquired in cash.
25 Id. § 220.4(a)(3). "An example of a transaction for which the special subscriptions
account is not intended would be as follows:
"A customer having a 'long' position of 100 shares of security 'A' in a 'restricted'
general account receives rights to subscribe to additional shares of security 'A.' Using
his rights, and possibly purchasing additional rights if necessary, he makes a subscription to 100 shares of security 'A' in the special subscriptions account on 25% margin.
He then sells the 100 shares of security •A' in his general account and withdraws 75%
of the net proceeds of sale.
"This customer did not use his rights as a stockholder to retain his equity in the
corporation. He merely used the rights as a device to carry the security position on
19
20
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B. Exchange Requirements

Illustrative of the exchange margin requirements is New York
Stock Exchange Rule 431, which provides both initial margin and
maintenance requirements.26 The required initial margin is an
amount equivalent to the maintenance requirement, with a minimum equity of 1,000 dollars. The maintenance requirement, which
is particularly significant because of the omission of a like requirement under Regulation T, depends upon the type of transaction.
For example, the aggregate of all securities "long"27 in the account must be constantly maintained at a twenty-five percent margin level.28 This required margin expresses the relationship of the
margin trader's equity in the securities to their current market
value. 29 Although listed securities exempted under Regulation T
are subject to Rule 431, they receive favorable treatment.30
C. Private Requirements
If the broker-dealer or other lender feels inadequately protected by the federal or exchange requirements, he may demand
and obtain higher initial margin and maintenance requirements
through separate agreements with individual traders. In any event,
all margin accounts are watched daily at brokerage houses, particularly those in which the need for more margin is becoming
apparent. When, in the broker's opinion, the margin gets too low,
which may be as much as forty percent of the current market value
of the security, he sends out a margin call for more cash or collateral. Normally a customer will be allowed three full business days
to meet the margin call, although the period may be as short as
one day.

IL

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

To determine the principal purpose underlying the federal
credit regulations, attention should be focused on the legislative
history of these provisions. As a resulf of the economic events fol25% margin instead of 75% margin by transferring it to the special subscriptions account." New York Stock Exchange M.F. Circular No. 79, at 2, July 12, 1951.
Rules 43l(a), (b).
A "long" position signifies ownership of securities, whereas a "short" position signifies securities sold short and not covered as of a particular date.
28 Rule 43l(b)(l). A customer may consolidate all transactions to support his posi•
tion.
29 See Rule 43l(d)(l) for determination of value for margin purposes.
30 Rule 43l(c)(2).
26
27
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lowing the stock market crash of 1929 some persons advocated the
complete prohibition of purchasing securities on credit, while
others adopted the thesis that, even though some margin should be
required, a liquid market-made liquid with borrowed fundsis desirable. 31 Although the latter view prevailed, the voluminous
hearings on the proposed legislation brought out a wide range of
opinions concerning the purposes which margin regulations should
serve.
Three primary objectives were advanced during the legislative
hearings as being the basic purposes for the enactment of legislation governing margin requirements. First, it was advocated that
the principal objective should be the protection of the margin
trader, sometimes referred to as the "innocent Iamb," in contradistinction to the protection of the broker-dealer afforded by the
exchange and private margin requirements. 32 The Senate report
asserted that the main objective of the margin regulations was to
protect the margin trader by making it impossible for him to buy
on too thin a margin,33 since in the event of unfavorable developments in the financial world such loans are promptly called and
may result in the forced sale of the margin trader's securities.34
Indeed, margin traders are frequently sold out near the bottom
of a market decline, thereby maximizing their losses. Secondly,
the opinion was expressed that margin regulations should be instruments of credit policy designed to stabilize stock market fluctuations and thus contribute to business stability. 35 In theory,
when security prices rise the margin trader has more available
credit to buy more securities on margin, and, in addition, more
investors may be induced to buy on margin. Such purchases, in
turn, tend to raise prices further and so increase again the ability
of the margin trader to borrow, whereas a decline in security prices
frequently results in forced selling to meet margin calls which, in
turn, increases the volume of sell orders and intensifies the decline
in prices. 36 Finally, the House committee took the position that
31 See generally BOGEN &: KRooss, SECURITY CREDIT ch. 8 (1960), for a general discussion of the background of the regulations.
32 On protection of Exchange members, see id. at 80.
33 Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Report on Stock Exchange Practices,
S. REP. No. 1955, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
34 "[N]o evidence has ever been gathered on the volume of 'distress selling' and the
number of persons forced out by the slim margins and great depreciations in price of
the early 1930's." VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERS 55 (1941).
3G Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 15 (1934).
36 BOGEN &: KRooss, op. cit. supra note 31, at 42-43.
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the margin regulations were to be designed as selective credit
controls to regulate the aggregate amount of credit which could
be directed into the stock market and out of the more productive
uses of commerce and industry.37 There was a desire to prevent a
recurrence of the pre-crash situation where capital which would
have otherwise been available to supply the needs of commerce,
industry and agriculture was attracted by the high interest rates
in the stock market. 38
The Exchange Act clearly states that credit regulations are
designed primarily to regulate the use of credit; section 7 granted
the Board authority to regulate the extension of credit "for the
purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the purpose
of purchasing and carrying securities."39 Moreover, Congress apparently intended that the Board's power would be used to prevent
undue market fluctuations and to help stabilize the economy in
general, because it directed the Board to adopt, as its initial method
of regulation, a formula based upon past price movements of each
security used as collateral.40 In addition, both of these objectives
are expressions of national credit policy, and after extended debate
the administration of the margin provisions was assigned to the
Federal Reserve Board, an agency designed to stabilize the nation's
economic progress, rather than to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is also of interest to note that the original bill was
rewritten along the lines suggested by the Federal Reserve Board
and the Treasury Department.41 In practice, the Board itself has
followed the philosophy that the regulations were intended to be
instruments of monetary policy. The Board chairman has stated:
"Regulation of stock market credit is a supplemental instrument of credit policy . . . , one of the means of making
a broad credit and monetary policy effective. . . . [E]ach instrument of credit policy ... should be used in such a manner
as to blend all the instruments into a harmonious whole for
the maximum contribution to stabilize economic progress for
the whole community."42
37 House Report on Stock Exchange Practices, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1934).
38 For other proposed objectives, see BOGEN & KRooss, op. cit. supra note 31, ch. 8.
39 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1958). See also § 2(3)(a), 48
Stat. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3)(a) (1958).
40 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1958).
41 BOGEN & KRooss, op. cit. supra note 31, at 94.
42 1 Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Monetary Policy and the Management
of the Public Debt, S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 409-10 (1952).
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This policy is reflected in the Board's justifications for the seventeen basic changes in margin requirements which it has ordered
from 1934 through 1962,43 and in the Board's establishment of a
lower margin requirement for the exercise of subscription rights.
Thus, regulation of the use of credit and stabilization of the stock
market would seem to constitute the primary objectives underlying
the federal credit regulations, with the protection of the "innocent
lamb" as only a possible by-product.
III.

JUSTIFICATION OF CML REMEDIES BASED UPON
THE ILLEGAL EXTENSION OF CREDIT

The Exchange Act contains no express civil remedy for the
illegal extension of credit. 44 The act does, however, contain three
specific civil liability sections: 9(e), for manipulation; 45 16(b), for
insiders' profits from short-swing trading; 46 and 18, for misleading
statements in documents filed with the SEC. 47 Also, courts have
afforded implied civil remedies under certain provisions of the
act; for example, private litigants have frequently recovered damages for violations of section IO(b), 48 an anti-fraud provision, and
the Commission's Rule IOb-5 issued thereunder. 49 For the most
part, the civil remedies, both express and implied, have been based
upon provisions designed to protect the investor from certain unfair practices such as misrepresentation and inadequate disclosure. 50 Most of the implied remedies can be justified on the ground
that they effectuate the underlying policy of the provisions, and
that, in addition, they are statutory alternatives for the commonlaw action for deceit. However, substantially different considerations are involved with regard to implied civil remedies under the
credit regulations. Not only were the regulations designed primarily as instruments of national fiscal policy, rather than to
provide protection to the investor, but also no public policy
against the extension of credit for the purchase of securities existed
at common law.
43 See BoGEN 8: KROoss, op. cit. supra note 31, app. III, at 169-77 (listing the stated
reasons for changes in margin requirements).
44 See 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1958).
41i 48 Stat. 890 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958).
46 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
47 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958).
48 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949).
liO See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
870 (1961); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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As the Senate report indicates, there was some opinion to the
effect that the principal objective of the credit regulations should
be the protection of the margin trader from the risk of trading on
too thin a margin. Indeed, this may be an intended by-product
of the regulations; but this hardly seems to be a sufficient justification for implying civil remedies for the illegal extension of credit.
Furthermore, most of the credit cases suggest that all margin traders are to be protected. 51 However, not all margin traders are "innocent lambs"; in fact, many are sophisticated investors and have
the facilities and sources of information needed for determining
the suitability of purchasing securities on credit. The margin
trader, not the broker-dealer, is a speculator, and he knowingly
assumes the risk of purchasing securities on an inadequate margin.
It seems doubtful that Congress intended that all margin traders
be treated as a special class of persons requiring protection from
their own lack of judgment.52 Moreover, even the inexperienced
trader is allowed complete discretion within the limits of the
margin requirements as to the amount of credit he can obtain;
whereas, in certain transactions not covered by Regulation T, the
broker-dealer is required to determine the suitability of the loan
arrangement in accordance with the individual's financial situation.53
On the other hand, implied remedies based- on violations of
the credit regulations may be justified to the extent that they contribute to the enforcement of those regulations. Although the
power to establish the regulations was assigned to the Federal
Reserve Board, enforcement was delegated to the SEC. In turn,
the SEC has allowed the stock exchanges to be more or less selfregulating in this regard. In light of the recent exposure of the
apparent inadequacy of self-regulation, 54 and the lack of manpower
in the SEC to police the individual broker-dealers adequately,
additional instruments of enforcement are apparently necessary.
Suits to enforce an implied civil liability may provide one such
51 See, e.g., Reader v. Hirsch &: Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Remar v. Clayton
Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
52 For an interesting example of special treatment to a particular class, cf. Glover
v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 12 N.E.2d 194 (1937); Bishop v. Liston, 112 Neb. 559, 199 N.W.
825 (1924) (both involving suits for damages for rape in which minors were treated as
a special class requiring protection).
53 See SEC Rule § 240.15c2-5, 27 Fed. Reg. 7091 (1962).
54 SEC, REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CONDUcr OF
MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (1962). See also SEC Plans Increased Securities Industry Control; Stricter Self-Regulation Urged, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1962, p. 2
(warning by William L. Cary, SEC Chairman).
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instrument. The risk of private litigation might deter a potential
violator, and, in addition, private actions would expose past violations that might otherwise go undiscovered. However, because of
the expense involved, it seems likely that only violations resulting in substantial losses to the margin trader will be the subject
of litigation, and these violations would probably be reported to
the Commission regardless of whether a private remedy existed.
Moreover, the broker-dealers' great fear is of publicity of alleged
violations, and this results as much from complaints registered
with the SEC or exchanges as from private litigation. Their
primary concern is the loss of good will and the accompanying
loss of business, rather than potential civil liability. Thus, whether
the implied civil remedies actually aid the enforcement of the
regulations appears to be dubious.

IV.

CIVIL REMEDIES

Federal courts55 have thus far not been hesitant in implying
civil remedies for violations of the federal credit regulations. In
the typical case, the broker-dealer illegally extends credit, and
when the price of the security declines, the margin trader is sold
out. Liability to the margin trader is based upon a general
tort theory or, alternatively, on the ground that the contract is
void. 56 Although both are traditional rationales for implied liabilities under the Exchange Act, 57 neither the tort nor the void
contract theory is easily adapted to cases involving the illegal extension of credit. Moreover, since the credit violation cases have all
been decided on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the decisions fail to resolve many problems peculiar to a cause of
action founded upon an illegal extension of credit.
The void contract theory is based upon section 29(b) of the
Exchange Act, which provides in part:
"Every contract made in violation of any provision of this
title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every contract . . . heretofore or hereafter made the performance of
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
rm The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in suits to enforce a liability or
duty created by the Exchange Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958).
GO See, e.g., Goldenberg v. Bache 8: Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959); Warshaw v.
Hentz &: Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
u7 For an excellent discussion of the alternative theories underlying the implied liabilities, see 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1757-63 (1961).
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relationship or practice in violation of any provision of this
title or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be void . . . as
regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule or regulation shall have made or engaged in
the performance of any such contract. . . ." 58
Although this statutory provision does not specifically provide for
a civil remedy, one court, in implying a remedy, has observed:
"[A] statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall
be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The
statute would be of little value unless a party to the contract
could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of obligations under
it...." 59 Relying on the 1938 amendment to section 29(b), which
deals in part with actions maintained in reliance upon the subsection,60 another court inferred that Congress, in passing the
amendment, manifested the intention that the original statute be
interpreted as providing for civil suits.61 Furthermore, this court
indicated, in dictum, that the plaintiff not only had an action for
rescission but also one for damages. The inclusion of a damage
remedy is dubious since the Senate report, in referring to the
amendment, expressed an intent favoring private litigation only
for rescission. 62
However, since section 29(b) voids only the rights of a party to
an illegal contract, it is not particularly suited to contracts involving the illegal extension of credit because of the three-fold
relationship between the broker-dealer and the margin trader.
In any particular transaction involving securities, a broker-dealer
acts either as the agent (broker) for the margin trader in purchasing from a third person, or as a principal (dealer), being the actual
vendor of the security; in advancing money for the purchase, the
broker-dealer becomes the margin trader's creditor; and, finally,
in holding the security to secure payment of his advances, the
broker-dealer becomes the pledgee of the security. 63 Since the
broker, in contradistinction to the dealer, is not a party to a valid
purchase contract, should a margin trader be able to recover his
58

48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1958).

Cf. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
60 52 Stat. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1958).
61 Geismar v. Bond &: Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
62 S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1938).
63 Eddy v. Schiebel, 112 Conn. 248, 152 Atl. 66 (1930). For the technical aspects of
the relationship, see generally BLACK, THE LAw OF STOCK EXCHANGES, STOCK BROKERS AND
CusroMERS (1940); MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (1931).
59 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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margin in an action for rescission against the broker, since the
margin only passed through the broker as a conduit to the innocent seller? Admittedly, a court may extend the illegality of the
loan arrangement to the purchase transaction, since the loan is
illegal under the regulations only to the extent that credit is extended for the purchase of securities. 64 The broker may be treated
as the vendor of the securities rather than as an agent who served
simply as a conduit between the margin trader and the innocent
vendor, and thus the margin trader may be allowed to rescind the
purchase agreement and recover his margin from the broker.
Although this requires strained reasoning, such a result may be
justified because most margin traders actually regard the broker,
rather than the unknown third party, as the vendor. But if the
credit is extended subsequent to the purchase, the connection
between the illegality of the loan arrangement and the purchase
transaction may be substantially weakened. 65 On the other hand,
since the rights of the broker-dealer are void on the loan arrangement, should the margin trader be able to receive a windfall by
retaining title to the stock66 and ignoring the illegal loan? Surely
with a little effort a court would be able to prevent a forfeiture
of the broker-dealer's interest which might otherwise result from
the margin trader's election to retain the securities and ignore
the void loan contract. For instance, one court equated the voiding
language of section 29(b) with a total breach of contract and allowed the seller, who had violated section 16 of the Exchange Act,
to recover the market value of the securities delivered. 61
Assuming that a court overcomes the aforementioned obstacles,
it still must determine whether the rights of the margin trader
are subject to the voiding provisions. One court has held that a
margin trader, allegedly entering into a contract in good faith and
without knowledge of Regulation T, is subject to section 29(b),
and that the good faith defense of the Exchange Act68 does not
apply to parties to the contract. 69 The decision is justifiable if a
literal construction is given to the language of section 29(b)(l),
See 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1518 (rev. ed. 1962), and cases cited therein.
See id. § 1529, and cases cited therein.
Title to stock is in the margin trader although the stock is immediately pledged to
the broker and held in "street name." Hobart v. Vanden Bosch, 256 Mich. 686, 240
N.W. 1 (19.32).
61 Banker's Life 8: Cas. Co. v. Ballanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
.368 U.S. 827 (1961).
68 Willful violation is a condition of criminal liability. Securities Exchange Act
of 19.34, § .32, 48 Stat. 904, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a) (1958).
60 Cohen v. G. F. Rothchild 8: Co., Civil No. 108-397, S.D.N.Y., March 31, 1958.
64
65
66
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which provides, in part, that "every contract shall be void ... as
regards the rights of any person who, in violation of such provision . . . shall have made any such contract or engaged in the
performance of any such contract." 7° Congress could have expressly
voided only the rights of a violator rather than ambiguously voiding the rights of "any person" who makes a contract in violation of the act. Even assuming that section 29(b) voids only
the rights of a violator, a court may be justified in regarding a
margin trader, who is aware of the regulations, as a violator, because he aided and abetted the broker-dealer in his violation.71
On the other hand, one court stated, in dictum, that the remedy
is not affected by the margin trader's participation in the violation
since Congress regards him as incapable of protecting himself.72
However, the credit regulations were not designed to insure the
margin trader who knowingly assumes the risk of too thin a margin
against a loss from his own speculation, but rather were designed
as instruments of credit policy. In a related area, New York courts
have twice denied relief to a margin trader whose claim was based
upon violations of exchange margin requirements, since a margin
trader presumably has the facilities to determine the suitability
of a loan arrangement. 73 There may, however, be some justification for protecting a margin trader who is inexperienced in purchasing securities on credit. Since the margin regulations are indeed complex, it does not seem unreasonable for an inexperienced
trader to rely upon the superior knowledge of the broker-dealer,
who holds himself out as an expert in the securities business.74
Perhaps the law should protect the inexperienced trader from his
own incapability. In fact, courts will probably continue to protect
at least the inexperienced trader, assuming that the prior decisions
which have merely denied motions to dismiss are actually indicative of the current judicial attitude toward questions of substance.
As an alternative ground for affording a civil remedy for vio48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(c) (1958).
The United States Criminal Code provides that whoever aids and abets in the
commission of an offense is a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). Where a broker arranged
for an illegal extension of credit by a private money lender, the latter was held to
have aided and abetted the broker, and was thus subject to § 29(b)'s voiding provisions.
Bonner v. Goldman, Civil No. 61-374-c, D. Mass., March 21, 1962.
72 Remar v. Cla)'ton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
73 Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
1953), afj'd, 284 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1954) (violation of a cotton exchange
margin requirement); Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 2d 628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y.
City Munic. Ct. 1961) (violation of New York Stock Exchange margin requirement).
74 Cf. Cardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (1950) (expert participating in
an illegal transaction).
10
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lation of credit regulations courts have turned to the law of torts,
in particular to the theory that if defendant's violation of a prohibitive statute75 results in a particular danger causing injury to
the plaintiff, the latter has a right of action if one of the purposes
of the enactment was to protect individual interests such as the
plaintiff's from that danger. 76 Even assuming that the credit regulations were designed to protect the inexperienced trader, there
are additional obstacles to applying this tort doctrine to credit
extension cases. Possibly the greatest of these obstacles is finding
the causal connection between the inadequate margin and the injury. Initially, the margin trader should be required to demonstrate that the inadequacy of the initial margin was a substantial
factor in causing the injury. 77 If he could have met the additional
margin call, then the initial inadequacy was not a significant cause.
Even if the margin trader was unable to meet the call, he should
be required to demonstrate that the extension of excessive credit
was the inducement for making the purchase.78 Assuming the inducement, the broker-dealer should be allowed to demonstrate that
an intervening event caused the injury. For example, the brokerdealer may have lawfully repledged the securities with a third
party who became insolvent79 or who converted the securities. 80
A court may even have difficulty in finding causation when the
loss results from the failure of the issuer of the securities,81 as
compared with a loss caused by a general decline in securities
prices. For the most part judicial decisions have expressly left open
the question of causal connection. 82
Perhaps the tort remedy should be available to an inexperienced
trader in certain cases, but not to a sophisticated trader who knowingly assumes the risk of an inadequate margin. Although the
amount of recovery allowed in a tort action would probably be
limited to out-of-pocket loss, and thus would be identical to the
75 The tort theory does not apply to violations of exchange margin requirements.
Nichols &: Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 284 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1954); Weis &: Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 2d
628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1961).
76 2 llEsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). See also Reader v. Hirsch &: Co., 197 F. Supp.
Ill, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (citing § 286); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014,
1017 (D. Mass. 1949) (leading case).
77 See PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at 218-19 (2d ed. 1955).
78 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum).
70 See, e.g., Warshow v. Hentz &: Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
80 See, e.g., Appel v. Levine, 85 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
81 See, e.g., Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715
(Sup. Ct. 1953), a[f'd, 248 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y .S.2d 591 (1954).
82 See, e.g., Warshow v. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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amount of recovery allowed under the void contract theory, the
former basis for liability may afford additional coverage. If the
broker-dealer is acting only in the capacity of creditor-pledgee,
not having participated in the purchase, the margin trader could
still rely upon the tort doctrine, even though the margin did not
pass through the broker-dealer. 83 Moreover, the broker-dealer may
have arranged for a third party to extend the credit and therefore may be acting solely in the capacity of an agent. Although
the availability of a claim against the broker-dealer on the void
contract theory seems dubious, the trader might rely upon the
tort doctrine since the broker-dealer has violated Regulation T
by arranging for an extension of credit in violation of the margin
requirements.
V.

CONCLUSION

It seems likely that courts will continue to imply civil remedies
for violations of credit regulations, at least for the protection of
inexperienced margin traders. However, recovery should be denied to the sophisticated trader on the ground that he is an accomplice in the violation. Denying him a remedy would serve
as a greater deterrent to future violations of Regulation T than
an allowance of relief. Surely the sophisticated trader would be hesitant to enter into an unenforceable contract and be branded as
a violator of a federal statute. Of course, a standard for deciding
who is an inexperienced trader must be determined, but, more
importantly, the courts must clarify the rights of the margin trader
generally if section 29(b) is to act as a significant deterrent to the
illegal extension of credit to the sophisticated trader.
Clarification of the implied civil remedies under the credit
r~gulations may provide a possible solution to the problem of
unregulated sources of credit for the purchase of securities. The
Federal Reserve Board has authority84 to prescribe rules and regulations governing the extension of credit to purchase securities
by persons other than exchange members and broker-dealers transacting a business in securities through such members.85 Pursuant
to that authority the Board has thus far issued Regulation U, which
is applicable only to banks.86 Credit provided by unregulated
83 Assuming the implied remedy based upon § 29(b) does not include an action for
damages.
84 48 Stat. 887 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1958).
85 If a broker-dealer transacts a business in securities through the medium of a
member, he is subject to the regulations even as to a particular transaction which is
not effected through a member. Federal Reserve Bull., Nov. 1938, p. 951.
86 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1959).
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lenders such as factors and foreign banks is not presently affected
by margin regulations.8 7 There is evidence that these unregulated
sources of credit have been employed frequently to circumvent
credit regulations, especially at times when high margin requirements were in effect."' The Board recognized the importance of
unregulated lending when it amended Regulation U in 1959 to
provide that reports may be required not only from banks, but
also from any person engaged substantially in the business of making loans for the purpose of purchasing and carrying listed securities.89 Lack of adequate enforcement facilities presents the major
obstacle to the effective application of margin requirements to
unregulated lenders. Some hope has been expressed that this obstacle can be overcome through the judicial development of implied remedies.90 Regrettably, there is no way to assess accurately
the deterrent effect on the illegal extension of credit resulting
from the existence of implied civil remedies.
Robert G. Lane, S.Ed.

87 But cf. Bronner v. Goldman, Civil No. 61-374-c, D. Mass., March 21, 1962 (private
money lenders held to have aided and abetted a broker-dealer in violating Regulation T).
Section 8(a) does make it unlawful for broker-dealers to borrow on listed securities except
from member banks, non-member banks who have agreed to abide by the Board's requirements, or other broker-dealers who are subject to the Board's rules. 48 Stat. 888
(1934), as aijended, 15 U.S.C. § 78h(a) (1958). Regulation U subjects to the margin
requirements any loan by a bank to a person engaged substantially in the business of
making loans for the purpose of purchasing or carrying registered securities. 12 C.F.R.
I 221.3q (Supp. 1962).
88 See Rossant, Credit as a Catalyst, N.Y. Times, July 80, 1962, p. 27, col. 2; What
Made the Market Go Wild?, Bus. Week, June 9, 1962, p. 90.
89 12 C.F.R. § 221.3j (Supp. 1962).
90 See Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (discussing jurisdiction over
foreign lenders).

